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It has become common over the last year to hear pundits declare that
Republicans, by scuttling immigration reform with an enforcement-only
mantra and turning vicious and nativistic during the recent election cam-
paigns, have won the battle (against liberalizing the immigration system) but
are poised to lose the war (for the Latino vote).  Short-term appeasement of a
base disgruntled with high levels of immigration, particularly from south of
the border, is increasingly alienating Latinos2—the electoral sleeping giant
whose support both parties need to remain relevant in American politics.
Commentators and Democrats find delicious irony in the right wing’s quick
unraveling, through immigration demagoguery, of Karl Rove’s years-long
strategy to entrench Republican power by incorporating a majority of Lati-
nos into the GOP fold.
This political analysis contains an assumption that warrants unpacking,
namely that the interests and sympathies of Latino voters are closely linked
to the interests of immigrants.  Political commentators assume that to win
the Latino vote politicians must answer the immigration question correctly
because Latinos will measure politicians’ responsiveness to their interests
using immigration as a metric.  Similarly, advocates interested in promoting
a Latino agenda and enhancing the political power of Latinos assume that
Latinos’ status as a group in the American political community requires solv-
ing the immigration puzzle and fighting for the integration of new
immigrants.
These correlations between the interests of new immigrants from Latin
America and the political fortunes and preferences of longstanding U.S. La-
tino populations are susceptible to two important and interrelated critiques:
1 Associate Professor of Law, NYU School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School, 2000; M.Litt.,
Oxford University, 1998; B.A., Yale College, 1995.
2 See, e.g., Paul Waldman, GOP Candidates Alienate Latino Voters, AM. PROSPECT, Aug.
15, 2007, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=gop_candidates_alienate_latino_voters;
Michael Gerson, Division Problem: The GOP’s Ruinous Immigration Stance, WASH. POST,
Sept. 19, 2007, at A23; Ezra Klein, With Immigration Reform Dead, Democrats Court Hispan-
ics and Republicans Go (more) Nativist, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.prospect.
org/cs/articles?article=after_failure (“[W]hen a party says again and again that you and peo-
ple like you are the biggest problem facing the country, it’s hard to muster up enthusiasm for
its candidates. If the GOP keeps this up, Latino Republicans could become like gay Republi-
cans, a tiny, beleaguered group waging a daily battle against cognitive dissonance,
scapegoated by their own party and mocked by their friends for associating with people who
despise them.”).  This sentiment has been articulated before, particularly with reference to
California Governor Pete Wilson’s support of Proposition 187 and the subsequent alienation of
Latinos from the GOP. See, e.g., Peter Beinart, New Bedfellows, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 11,
1997, at 22-26 (noting that Latinos have been alienated by right-wing attacks on immigration).
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one empirical and one a matter of political strategy.  Empirically speaking,
the relationship between the Latino vote and immigration politics appears to
be quite complex, defying easy conclusions about the impact the Republican
position on immigration will have on long-term voting patterns.3  It is not
obvious what it means to get the immigration question right from the Latino
perspective, though some recent studies of Latino public opinion suggest
that the Republicans’ harsh immigration rhetoric is heightening Latino skep-
ticism of the party.4  For the politicians vying for the Latino vote, the empiri-
cal relationship between immigration politics and voting patterns is a crucial
one to understand and should occasion continued social scientific
investigation.
But the critique I take up in this Essay is the strategic one, aimed not at
vote-seeking politicians, but at Latinos and their allies interested in promot-
ing Latino civic participation—the animating theme of this symposium.  The
critique begins with the question: should we embrace or resist the close cor-
relation of Latino political identity with the immigration question?  Do Lati-
nos qua Latinos elide more important community interests when their
leaders focus on immigration as a core Latino concern, or is this focus re-
quired to secure the status of Latinos in the American political community?
Relatedly, to what extent does securing robust Latino participation depend
on addressing the interests of new immigrants?
I conclude that the correlation between Latinos and immigrants is ines-
capable, whether individual Latinos prefer to divorce themselves from their
immigrant ancestry or from the immigration circumstances of Latinos with
national origins distinct from their own.  The immigration issue must be em-
braced as a Latino issue because the interests of U.S. Latinos and Latin
American immigrants are intertwined.  Promoting group solidarity and ad-
3 See, e.g., PEW HISPANIC CTR., LATINOS AND THE 2006 MID-TERM ELECTION (2006),
available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/26.pdf (exit poll data revealed an 11-point
swing in favor of Democrats among Latino voters between the 2004 election and the 2006
mid-term election, in which many Republican candidates used immigration as a wedge issue,
in contrast to only a six-point swing toward Democrats among white voters).  According to the
study, “something distinctive occurred among Latino voters this year that rewarded the Demo-
crats and punished the Republicans.” Id. at 2.  However, it would be premature to connect that
“something distinctive” to the immigration issue, considering the mixed results on the immi-
gration question in Arizona. Id. at 3. See also Maria Echaveste, Rising Tide: What the Midterm
Election Results Tell Us About Hispanic Voters, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 22, 2006, http://www.
prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=12350 (assessing the
2006 election results and concluding that Latinos have nuanced views with respect to immigra-
tion and that the Latino population in the United States is diverse linguistically, culturally, and
politically).
4 In a recent study, the Pew Hispanic Center revealed the following numbers: forty-four
percent of Latino registered voters say that Democrats are the party with more concern for
Latinos, eight percent identify Republicans as the party with more concern, and forty-one
percent say there is no difference between the parties; forty-one percent of registered voters
say Democrats are doing a better job of addressing illegal immigration, whereas fourteen per-
cent favor the Republican approach; and seventy-nine percent of Hispanics identify immigra-
tion as an “extremely” or “very” important issue in the 2008 election. See PAUL TAYLOR &
RICHARD FRY, PEW HISPANIC CTR., HISPANICS AND THE 2008 ELECTION: A SWING VOTE?, at ii
(2007), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=83.
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vancing new and compelling civil rights agendas also could be invoked as
reasons for a focus on immigration.  But even for those who are not exer-
cised by such objectives, self-interest requires engaging the immigration
debate.
The question then becomes how Latinos should approach the immigra-
tion question while simultaneously promoting Latino political participation
in the long term.  Effective participation by Latinos as a group demands that
the community focus on the integration concerns of Latin American immi-
grants.  Accordingly, Latinos and their allies must approach immigration-
related politics from a perspective that prioritizes immigrant integration and
what I will call the “normalization” of immigrant identity into mainstream
American political identity.
In Part I of this Essay, I explore the dangers of joining the agendas of
Latino civic participation and immigration.  It is important to see clearly the
costs of closely aligning the interests of Latinos with Latin American immi-
grants, and to appreciate the ways in which the interests of these populations
diverge.  In Part II, I first consider the interconnection between the two sets
of interests and then establish why promoting immigrant integration is es-
sential to securing long-term Latino political participation.
Before delving into this analysis, a few ground rules for the discussion
should be elaborated.  First, I assume that securing maximum participation
by Latinos as a group should be a raison d’eˆtre of civil rights advocates and
the Latino community.  Second, I use the term Latino to refer to U.S. citi-
zens with Latin American ancestry, whether native-born or naturalized, and
the term Latin American or immigrant to refer to recent immigrants, legal
and illegal, who have not yet been incorporated formally into the body poli-
tic through citizenship.5  The purpose of this distinction is not just to distin-
guish between citizens and non-citizens, but to capture the effects prolonged
presence within the United States has on one’s political interests and identity.
The distinction is a reference to the process by which those who arrive in the
United States as Mexicans, Cubans, and Central and South Americans even-
tually become part of a larger collectivity called “Latino.”6  Finally, I as-
sume that Latino represents a meaningful category.7  Identifying as Latino is
hardly mutually exclusive with identifying with one’s country of origin.
Though U.S. citizen Latinos may identify more strongly as Mexicans,
Cubans, or Puerto Ricans than as Latinos and may seek to distance them-
5 This distinction inevitably obscures the unique status of Puerto Ricans, who are formal
citizens by birth but who have sociological experiences vis-a`-vis assimilation similar to immi-
grants.  Though citizens from the beginning, Puerto Ricans who resettle inside the United
States also undergo a process of “Latinoization,” though arguably according to a different
dynamic given their “home” society’s inclusion in the United States as a commonwealth.
6 I recognize that one can also effectively become Latino before becoming a U.S. citizen,
but for simplicity’s sake I draw the distinction between Latin American immigrants and citizen
Latinos.
7 I explore the validity of this assumption infra Part II and in other work. See Cristina M.
Rodrı´guez, From Litigation, Legislation, 119 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (noting limita-
tions on treating Latinos as a coherent group in the political process).
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selves from one another, as well as from recently arrived immigrants who
share their national origin,8 the curiously American formulation “Latino”
still has meaning.  In fact, becoming Latino (as well as rejecting the label)
arguably represents a first and important step in assimilating into American
society.
I. IMMIGRATION AS DISTRACTION
The chief Latino interest organizations, such as the National Council of
La Raza, the League of United Latin American Citizens, and the Mexican
American and Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Funds, are deeply
involved in today’s immigration debate.  This involvement suggests that
these groups have come to at least two conclusions: the status of Latinos in
the United States, their original constituents, cannot be divorced from the
immigration question, and Latin American immigrants, by virtue of crossing
the border, have become their constituents.  Through legislative lobbying
and litigation, these organizations have become indispensable and loud
voices on immigration law and policy matters.  Their missions, to varying
degrees and with different emphases, have become inextricably tied to the
immigration issue.
This involvement makes perfect sense.  Though immigrants come to the
United States from all over the world, today’s immigration debate is driven
largely by the presence of millions of Latin American and Mexican immi-
grants.  Approximately fifty percent of the total number of immigrants to the
United States comes from Latin America.9  With the public and politicians
focused on the unauthorized population in particular, the southern border
and our country’s relationship to it loom large in the debate; indeed, nearly
eighty percent of unauthorized immigrants are from Mexico and Central
America.10  We thus should expect the groups whose constituents share a
history of crossing that border to become involved in the immigration
question.
Though I believe the focus of Latino interest organizations on immigra-
tion to be necessary and valuable, there are reasons to be wary of drawing a
8 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Latino Identity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L.
REV. 197 (1998) (exploring tensions between native-born and immigrant Latino groups); see
also Juan Castillo, Tensions & Alliances, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Nov. 10, 2007, http:/
/www.statesman.com/search/content/news/interactive/11/111107_latino.html (video project
citing anecdotal evidence that Mexican Americans in Austin resent immigrants who do not
appreciate Mexican American culture, including Tex-Mex food, and that Mexican immigrants
believe they are discriminated against by Mexican Americans).
9 See Marcelo M. Sua´rez-Orozco, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Assimila-
tion But Were Afraid To Ask, in MARCELO M. SUA´REZ-OROZCO, ET AL., THE NEW IMMIGRA-
TION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 67 (2005) (noting also that twenty-seven percent of
immigrants come from Asia).
10 See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES at i-ii (2006), available at http://
pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=61.
\\server05\productn\H\HLA\11\HLA1105.txt unknown Seq: 5 24-APR-08 9:34
2008] Symposium: Latinos and Immigrants 251
close correlation between the interests of an extant minority population and
the interests of immigrants.  The conflation of Latinos with immigrants pro-
duces two different sets of problems, both of which perpetuate stereotypes
about Latinos: what I call the perpetual transition problem and the social
dysfunction problem.  These two dilemmas, which I explain below, are ulti-
mately in tension with each other.  Whereas the former is based on the con-
clusion that Latinos, like immigrants, are outsiders, the latter is based on the
conclusion that U.S. Latinos do not measure up to Latin American immi-
grants.  The existence of both of these modes of thinking suggests that the
interests of immigrants and Latinos alike would be better served if the
groups were not treated as perpetually related to one another.
First, the correlation between immigrants and Latinos reinforces the
tendency to think of Latinos as foreign.  Calls for “assimilation” always
arise in response to significant immigration waves, and current assimilation
discourse revolves around the characteristics that define Latin American im-
migration.  This discourse inevitably labels certain of the qualities possessed
by immigrants as extra-American.11  The immigration/assimilation rhetorical
dynamic, when linked closely to Latino political identity, keeps alive the
equation of Latinos with foreigners.  Connecting Latinos with immigrants
simultaneously obscures the extent to which Latinos have assimilated, or
come to see the United States as their one and only home, and marks the
cultural characteristics of Latinos as foreign.  In other words, the articulation
of immigration as a Latino issue only entrenches the public perception of the
population as an immigrant population, or a population in perpetual
transition.12
In particular, this transition rhetoric helps define Latino cultural charac-
teristics, primarily the speaking of Spanish, as impositional and foreign, as
opposed to as indigenous features of American life and history.  Treating the
Latino population as an immigrant population facilitates the elision of a rich
Latino heritage, including a Spanish-language heritage, that is part and par-
cel of the aesthetic, literary, and demographic stock of the United States,
thus making claims concerning the historical rootedness of Latino culture as
American culture difficult to advance.  But, of course, the Latino presence in
the United States is neither exclusively the result of immigration—see the
11 In other work, I engage in extended reflection over what assimilation entails and argue
that assimilation properly defined captures changes experienced by minority and majority
populations alike when they come into contact with one another. See Cristina M. Rodrı´guez,
Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of what Immigrants and Americans Owe
One Another, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL. F.  219, 228-57.
12 This construction could, of course, be perceived as a relative advantage.  Whereas
Asians have been declared unassimilable, even within the context of an equality discourse, and
have been excluded from entry to and citizenship in the United States, Latinos historically
have been thought of as simply in need of assimilation. Cf. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There is a race so different from our own that we do not
permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons belonging to it
are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese
race.”).
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Puerto Rican population and the Mexican American population whose pres-
ence in the Southwest precedes Anglo settlement—much less of the record
immigration that has transpired since 1990.13  Rather, the current wave of
immigration is adding to and changing a long-entrenched and politically
powerful population marked by a complex but identifiable “ethnic”
character.
The failure to emphasize the separation between Latinos and Latin
American immigrants thus undermines efforts to settle the question of La-
tino qua Latino belonging.  With each angst-ridden debate about immigrant
assimilation, the notion that Mexican Americans and other Latinos refuse to
abandon their extra-American identities persists, effacing the recognition of
Mexican American or Latino culture as American culture, and encouraging
the suspicion that Latinos are not fully loyal to the United States.14  Precisely
because of the correlation drawn by the general public between Latinos and
immigrants, Latinos are under the constant pressure of having to prove their
American bona fides by putting their Latino identity in its proper place.  This
demand prevents Latinos from simply being who they are, requiring them
instead to take a stance on questions of assimilation versus cultural preserva-
tion and to defend Latino culture from charges that it produces the sort of
poverty and socioeconomic limitations that are characteristic of the unautho-
rized immigrant population.15
To be sure, precisely what Mexican American or Latino identity, di-
vorced from the immigrant experience, entails is a subject of change and
contestation.  Defining which aspects of Latino culture are “old” and there-
fore indigenous and which are “new” and therefore foreign may be counter-
productive or impossible.  On the one hand, the prevalence of Spanish in the
United States is new, particularly in parts of the country experiencing signif-
13 See Sua´rez-Orozco, supra note 9, at 67 (noting that the immigrant population grew by R
thirty percent between 1990 and 1997 and that whereas ninety percent of all immigrants in
1950 came from Europe or Canada, today almost eighty percent of immigrants come from
Latin America and Asia). For further sampling of the literature documenting the characteristics
and extent of current immigration, see RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERI-
CAN MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION (2003); Mary C. Waters
& Toma´s R. Jime´nez, Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical
Challenges, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 105 (2005).
14 In a recent Pew Hispanic Center Study, Roger Waldinger found that just nine percent of
Latino immigrants are “highly attached” to their countries of origin by sending remittances,
making phone calls at least once a week, and traveling back to their country in the last two
years. See ROGER WALDINGER, PEW HISPANIC CTR., BETWEEN HERE AND THERE: HOW AT-
TACHED ARE LATINO IMMIGRANTS TO THEIR NATIVE COUNTRY?, at ii (2007), available at http:/
/pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=80.  He also concluded that a majority of these
most attached immigrants intend to stay in the United States. Id. at 21.
15 Indeed, another reason to resist aligning the interests of immigrants and Latinos is that
the socioeconomic and cultural distinctions between unauthorized Latin American immigrants
and U.S. Latinos are vast, and it is not in the interests of Latinos who seek incorporation into
the American mainstream for Latinos to be perceived as predominantly poor and uneducated.
See Echaveste, supra note 3 (assessing the 2006 election results and concluding that Latinos
have nuanced views with respect to immigration and that the Latino population in the United
States is diverse linguistically, culturally, and politically).
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icant immigration for the first time, because it is spoken widely and prima-
rily only by immigrants and hardly at all by third generation Latinos.  But
the presence of the Spanish language in the United States is also a very old
phenomenon because it has always been spoken inside the United States and
by Americans.16  But whether or not it is possible to be precise in answering
the question of what Latino identity is, the close correlation between the
Latino population and the immigrant experience has the effect of removing
this debate from the table, preventing identities and characteristics that devi-
ate from an elusive Anglo-American norm from being embraced as fully
assimilated, American identities.  Among the consequences of this framing
is that equality claims made by Latinos that hinge on a defense of character-
istics or practices that can be identified as “cultural” become claims for
special treatment.  The claim, for example, that English-only workplace
rules have an impermissible disparate impact on Latinos in violation of an-
tidiscrimination laws is transformed into a claim for special treatment in the
workplace, reflective of Latinos’ failure to assimilate.17
The second significant consequence of joining the causes of Latinos
and immigrants is that to do so facilitates the drawing of contrasts between
newly arrived immigrant populations and long-present ethnic populations in
ways that scramble various civil rights objectives.  Whereas an assimilation-
ist or a nativist might look at immigrants and Latinos standing together and
conclude that the latter refuse to assimilate, an employer or a business inter-
est might consider the pairing and celebrate the striving immigrant, yet con-
demn the poor work ethic and tendencies toward dependency of existing
minority populations.  The availability of this condemnation, which is facili-
tated when Latinos and immigrants are considered to be part of the same
“group,” justifies the diversion of energy and resources from addressing
persistent disadvantage and the lack of economic opportunity that might pro-
duce it.18  The condemnation helps to frame disadvantage as the result of
Latinos’ moral failings, rather than as the result of broader historical and
structural factors.  Put slightly differently (and reductively), the low-wage
immigrant’s willingness to work under substandard conditions and without
complaint arguably makes the welfare and antidiscrimination claims of en-
trenched Latino (and other minority) populations more difficult to advance
16 For a discussion of the generational aspects of the language diversity, see Cristina M.
Rodrı´guez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 687, 690-93 (2006).
17 I discuss the way in which courts treat the speaking of non-English languages by bilin-
gual individuals who speak English as impositional in Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, Language Di-
versity in the Workplace, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1728-32, 1711-20 (2006).
18 This same criticism could be made of the category Latino in the first place, given that
the category lumps together subgroups and individuals of distinct races and class backgrounds.
The apparent success of some Latino immigrant groups—Cubans, for example—arguably
makes the welfare and discrimination-based claims of entrenched Latino (and other immi-
grant) populations more difficult to advance by making such groups’ relative lack of success
attributable to dysfunction rather than disadvantage.
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because the latter are forced to make their claims in the shadow of stereo-
types about Latinos that the nature of today’s immigration helps entrench.19
The moral of the story may well be that immigrants20 and Latinos both
would be better off if the distinctions between their interests were empha-
sized clearly.  What is more, even if neither of these dilemmas existed, link-
ing Latinos and immigrants might still be counterproductive.  If we imagine
Latinos as having collective objectives, the incorporation of justice and fair-
ness for immigrants into those objectives may, in the end, diffuse the civil
rights energy of the community.  Foregrounding the immigration question
challenges the formation of Latino solidarity by placing new and distinct
issues onto the Latino agenda.  Indeed, the results of the 2006 mid-term
elections revealed a certain amount of ambivalence toward the immigration
question, suggesting that some Latinos perceive it to be in their interest to
distance Latino concerns from liberal immigration policies.21  Indeed, a re-
cent survey conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center revealed that even
though the immigration issue has enjoyed a high profile among Latinos in
the run up to the 2008 election, when Latino registered voters are asked to
19 A related consequence of the Latino/immigrant pairing is that it may skew the focus of
affirmative action programs and other efforts designed to combat the legacy of historical dis-
crimination.  Tapping into the immigrant portion of the Latino pool may result in unintended or
inappropriate beneficiaries. Cf. Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants? The
Unintended Consequences of Reform, in COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION,
AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA 61-68 (John David Skretny, ed., 2001) (noting that
“the unique moral force of affirmative action’s original public rationale, as a temporary rem-
edy to compensate for the lingering, institutionalized effects of past discrimination against the
descendants of slaves, was eroded when preferences were extended to newly arrived immi-
grants from Asia and Latin America”).  In the litigation challenging the University of Michi-
gan Law School’s affirmative action program, for example, an admissions officer notoriously
was reported to have declared that Cubans should not be counted as Latinos because of their
success. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Cf.
Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic
Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 155-56 (2003) (noting that some institutions “fail to probe
beyond the checked boxes to determine who really identifies with the underrepresented groups
the institution seeks to enroll: they often overlook talented, American-born, African Americans
and Latinos in favor of higher-scoring recent immigrants from Africa, the West Indies, and
South America”).
20 This separation is arguably in the interests of immigrants, too. Immigrants need ser-
vices, particularly language services, to help them navigate institutions such as hospitals and
schools, and to mediate their interactions with officials, such as police, and their participation
in the political process once they become citizens through mechanisms such as the bilingual
ballot.  Part of the general public’s resistance to language services stems from the conclusion
that they prevent immigrants from assimilating and are part of a broader Latino agenda of
cultural preservation.  In other words, by conflating immigrants with Latinos, the particular
language needs of immigrants are more easily characterized as part of a broader agenda resis-
tant to assimilation, rather than as necessary transitional devices.
21 This ambivalence resembles the feelings of Mexican Americans during the Bracero era,
when Mexican Americans resented the Mexican laborers brought in to perform agricultural
work in the Southwest under the auspices of the program, but simultaneously defended their
interests given the inevitable connections between Mexican Americans and the Bracero labor-
ers forged as a result of family and national ties. See MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLE-
GAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 149 (2004).  I discuss this relationship in
more detail in Rodrı´guez, Guest Workers and Integration, supra note 11.
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identify the issues in the campaign most important to them, immigration
comes in fifth, after education, health care, the economy, and crime.22
At the end of the day, whether to emphasize immigration as a core
Latino concern presents political questions: Who should be able to claim the
Latino mantle?  Who should be the object of advocates’ attention?  How di-
verse or differentiated can the category become before it loses its salience or
power as an expression of coherent political or associational interests?  It is
instructive that this debate is also playing out within the academic discipline
of Latino studies, underscoring that it is one of the central problematics of
Latino identity.  In that context, the debate is over whether the articulation
and study of transnational Latino communities would invigorate and make
more complete the Latino studies agenda, or whether it would distract the
discipline from its origins in Chicano/a and Puerto Rican studies and thus
from its critical and self-consciously anti-hegemonic roots.23  Is the transna-
tional turn a threat to the local, or does it offer a way of better understanding
the local?
In answering these questions, the dilemmas I have outlined must be part
of the discussion.  My ultimate conclusion is that, despite these limitations,
the correlation between immigrants and Latinos must be embraced.  The
transnational and immigrant dimensions of Latino identity are inescapable,
and figuring out how to address immigration without obscuring the wider
array of Latino interests is precisely what advocates and scholars should be
attempting to accomplish.  I now turn to explain why.
II. IMMIGRATION AND POWER
The disassociation of the Latino agenda from immigrants and the immi-
gration debate would be neither conceptually coherent nor politically feasi-
ble.  Conceptually, the union of immigrants and Latinos is required by the
nature of Latino identity.  The move toward transnationalism in Latino stud-
ies, for example, has been precipitated by the recognition that the nation
state cannot remain the sole unit of analysis for exploring Latino identity,
cultural production, and political status, in part because “Latino identities
begin their formation not in the U.S. but in Latin America.”24  Though the
Latino population in the United States has originated from a variety of dif-
ferent historical relationships between the United States and the countries of
22 See TAYLOR & FRY, supra note 4, at 10 (noting that ninety-four percent of Hispanics R
consider education extremely or very important, followed by ninety-one percent on the subject
of health care, ninety-one percent on the subject of jobs, eighty-four percent on the subject of
crime, and seventy-nine percent on the subject of immigration).
23 For an example of a call for transnationalism, see Maria Josefina Saldan˜a-Portillo, From
the Borderlands to the Transnational? Critiquing Empire in the 21st Century, in A COMPAN-
ION TO LATINO STUDIES (Juan Flores & Renato Rosaldo eds., 2008) (on file with author).
24 See id. (explaining that this process is an effect of “U.S. intervention and compulsory
neoliberalism”).
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Latin America, its existence is a function of those many relationships, whose
formation continues through today’s record immigration, which in turn re-
peats the patterns of previous contact and creates new paradigms of contact.
The lives of naturalized citizens and even second and third generation Lati-
nos are powerfully shaped by immigration law, as well as by the narrative
and sociological dimensions of the immigrant experience.
As a political matter, even if U.S. Latinos could distance themselves
and their interests from those of Latin American immigrants, Latinos have
no choice but to engage the immigration issue, for two reasons.  First, the
correlation between immigrant identity and Latino identity will be made for
Latinos by the general public.  The designation of outsider always has fol-
lowed Latinos.  Despite the fact that they preceded Anglo settlers in the
Southwest, Latinos have been regarded as historically distinct from the
“core” or “mainstream” population.  This divide is an old one, but it is
perpetuated by the modern discourse of “minority” groups and the formula-
tion of Latinos as a racial minority—a status Latinos sought for themselves
after several decades of demanding recognition as white—in the landmark
Hernandez v. Texas decision.25
More to the point, the constant replenishment of Latino populations
through heavy immigration since 1965 has produced Latino demographic
cohorts that are necessarily in transition.  This constant “newness” of Latino
cultures, at least for now, is an inescapable feature of Latino identity, if only
because fellow citizens inevitably conflate new and old Latinos.  For the
general public, the immigration debate is closely related to what it means to
be Latino in the United States, even for those whose presence in this country
is generations old.
Even if most opposition to immigration can be justified by factors that
have little to nothing to do with U.S. citizen Latinos, there is an almost
imperceptible line between the current furor over illegal immigration and
trepidation over the Latinoization of the United States—a line that is regu-
larly crossed in the immigration debate.  As I have written elsewhere, the
vehement opposition to unauthorized immigration cannot be separated en-
tirely from a growing sense of cultural peril experienced by vocal subsets of
the Anglo or white populations of this country.  To put it crudely, many of
the anti-illegal immigrant ordinances that have been passed by states and
localities also reflect contempt for or distrust of Latino and Mexican culture,
25 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (invalidating conviction of Mexican
agricultural worker on the grounds that the jury was the result of racial discrimination in a
county in which a Mexican American had not served on a jury for 25 years).  In Hernandez,
the Supreme Court essentially recognized Latinos as a subgroup entitled to heightened protec-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause. See also Neil Foley, Over the Rainbow: Hernandez v.
Texas, Brown v. Board of Education, and Black v. Brown, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 139,
140 (2005) (discussing process by which Mexican Americans moved from challenging school
desegregation on the grounds that they were white to building alliances with black civil rights
leaders).
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including anxiety over the growing prevalence of the Spanish language.26
Latinos can try to distance themselves from these characteristics by insisting
that they have completely assimilated, but the association will remain in the
minds of the public.
Given the inevitability of the Latino-immigrants correlation, the Latino
agenda should include efforts to normalize the presence of Latino immigrant
culture in the United States.  By normalization I do not mean resistance to or
rejection of assimilation; a normalization agenda would include a real, as
opposed to rhetorical, commitment to integration measures.  By normaliza-
tion, I instead mean to suggest that Americans should be encouraged to re-
gard the process of cultural change occasioned by immigration as
bidirectional and as time and labor intensive.  The objective should be to
move public sentiments in the direction of treating the presence of Latino
immigrants and their cultural characteristics as a domestic social condition,
not as a dilemma to be overcome.  In other work, I have advanced this nor-
malization goal by articulating a concept of cultural and social burden shar-
ing, whereby assimilating immigrants, their descendants, and members of
the “majority” adapt to one another by accepting a certain amount of the
cultural dislocation that must occur in a diverse society for it to function.27
This normalization requires, among other things, changing the framework
through which public debate concerning immigration is mediated so that im-
migration comes to be seen by the public not as something that happens to
us, but as a dynamic we participate in creating and from which we benefit.
The second reason the immigration-Latino connection should be em-
braced by Latinos themselves is that even if it were conceptually possible to
draw firm lines between U.S. Latinos and immigrant Latin Americans, La-
tino group political power depends in the long term on the former engaging
the latter.  As the Pew Hispanic Center has reported, only eighteen percent
of Latinos voted in the 2004 elections, whereas fifty-one percent of non-
Hispanic whites and thirty-nine percent of blacks went to the polls.28
Though there are a number of explanations for this discrepancy, including
26 See Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, E Pluribus Unum: How Bilingualism Strengthens American
Democracy, 4 DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS 37, 37-38 (2007).
27 See Rodrı´guez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, supra note 17, at Part I.B. (argu- R
ing that accepting bilingualism in the workplace is required under a properly formulated bur-
den-sharing framework because it represents acceptance of the second and sometimes third-
generation consequences of immigration and promotes important forms of social bonding at
the same time).
28 See ROBERTO SURO & GABRIEL ESCOBAR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 2006 NATIONAL SUR-
VEY OF LATINOS: THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE (2006), http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php
?ReportID=68.  The Pew Hispanic Center has reported similar discrepancies for the 2006
elections, in which thirteen percent of the Latino population voted, as compared to thirty-nine
percent of whites and twenty-seven percent of blacks.  The report also notes that though Lati-
nos accounted for almost half of population growth between 2002 and 2006, they represent
only twenty percent of new voters. See PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE LATINO ELECTORATE: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE 2006 ELECTION (2007), available at http://pewhispanic.org/factsheets/fact
sheet.php?FactsheetID=34.
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the relative youth of the Latino population, the fact that millions of Latinos
in the United States today are not citizens and therefore remain ineligible to
vote29 is the “most significant explanation for Latino nonvoting.”30  In other
words, incorporating immigrant Latinos into the formal political fold and
motivating them to vote is the key to ensuring that Latinos participate in the
electoral arena at a level commensurate with their numbers in the popula-
tion.  To advance their interests as a group in the political process, Latinos
must champion immigrant integration.
This conclusion is, of course, based on unstable assumptions—that in-
dividuals of Latin American origin form a coherent group or category and
that the interests of native-born and foreign-born Latinos are sufficiently in-
tertwined that we should think of the fate of the former as tied to the power
of the latter.  Because challenging these assumptions opens the slipperiest
can of worms for Latinos, I and many of the scholars who write about the
Latino vote assume coherence on some level.  Even though critiques of this
coherence assumption could fill volumes, I ultimately believe that it is
broadly defensible, and not simply because of the ways in which mainstream
American legal and popular culture lump all Latinos into a single category.
In the face of the many divergent interests I describe in Part I, coher-
ence is certainly not chimerical within each of the major Latino subgroups,
i.e., within the Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Dominican communities.
Diasporic networks are such that there will always be an interconnection of
second and third generations with immigrant generations.  The United States’
proximity to Latin America heightens that connection, and though transna-
tional identification is hardly a new phenomenon, ease of travel and commu-
nication, coupled with greater social tolerance for multiple identities, renders
the connections across the borders of cultures and countries strong, though
by no means all encompassing.31  As between Latino subgroups, coherence
may be harder to identify, but, again, it is not pure political fantasy.  Lin-
guistic ties, shared historical experiences,32 and other cultural similarities in
29 See Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio, Reshaping the Tub: The Limits of the VRA
for Latino Electoral Politics, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT at 148 (David Ep-
stein, et al., eds., 2006) (“The most significant explanation for nonvoting among Latino adults
is noncitizenship.  In the 1990s, approximately 40 percent of Latino adults were not U.S. citi-
zens.”); see also id. at 146-47 (“[N]on-U.S. citizen Latino adults have been the most rapidly
growing share of Latino nonvoters.  The number of Latino adult non-U.S. citizens increased
from 2.6 million in 1976 to 11.0 million in 2004, an increase of nearly 489 percent.”).
30 Id. at 148.
31 For a discussion of today’s transnationalism and the forms of cross-border identification
it is producing, see Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, The Citizenship Paradox in a Transnational Age,
MICH. L. REV. 2008 ANN. SURV. OF  BOOKS RELATED TO LAW (forthcoming 2008).
32 At least two forms of shared historical experience are relevant: the common history
many Latin American countries share vis-a`-vis their relationship to the United States, and the
history of similar treatment inside the United States.
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religious and family values, as well as in aesthetic and material cultures,
give definition to the group label Latino.33
Given these simultaneously imposed and self-sustained connections
among U.S. Latinos and immigrants from Latin America, I conclude this
Essay with a brief consideration of five strategies Latinos and their advo-
cates should pursue to promote immigrant integration, with the objective of
expanding Latino civic participation over the long term.  Each of these strat-
egies will help create not only formal citizens, but also informed and en-
gaged citizens.
First, the most obvious, immediate, and non-controversial means of ad-
dressing the gap between group numbers and group participation is the pro-
motion of naturalization targeted at both Latin American immigrants and the
agencies responsible for facilitating naturalization.34  As immigrant-heavy
states such as Illinois have recognized, actively promoting naturalization
among eligible non-citizens and thereby encouraging their integration into
the community would be a wise way to spend resources.35  Similarly, efforts
targeted at Congress and the administrative bureaucracy to force timely
processing of naturalization applications and to ward off fee increases that
would price certain immigrants out of the citizenship market, which are part
and parcel of advocates’ agendas, must continue.
But naturalization will inevitably take time and will leave out immi-
grants who are not eligible to naturalize, who cannot naturalize without los-
ing the citizenship of their country of origin, or who do not intend to
permanently resettle in the United States, despite their prolonged presence
and de facto membership.  In other words, even if the mechanism of natural-
ization works seamlessly across acceptable periods of transition time, a de-
mocracy deficit will be unavoidable.  Individuals tied to citizens and with
their own interests vis-a`-vis governments in the United States will remain
formally outside the political process, unable to take part in shaping the laws
that affect them.  This is, of course, to be expected by virtue of the way
citizenship is constructed in the United States today.  But, as the population
33 I discuss this issue in more detail in Rodrı´guez, From Litigation, Legislation, supra
note 7 (“In the world of voting rights litigation, where group power matters, the fact that a R
group made up of people with shared interests does not have the power of its numbers should
be a cause for concern; the interests of the members of the group may not be overlapping, but
they are intertwined.  Indeed, the hallmark of the group-based view is not that all members of
that group think alike, or are fungible, but that certain commonalities will produce shared
interests in the outcome of the political process.  When the measure of a group, particularly
one to whom the VRA is directly addressed, is not fully taken, pluralist politics suffers, be-
cause it becomes less representative and less fair.”).
34 I discuss this platform in more detail in Rodrı´guez, From Litigation, Legislation, supra
note 7. See also de la Garza & DeSipio, supra note 29, at 148-50 (discussing the importance of R
naturalization drives to the Latino vote).
35 See ILL. COALITION FOR IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RIGHTS, FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL:
STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENHANCE THE STATE’S ROLE IN THE INTEGRATION OF IMMI-
GRANTS IN ILLINOIS 4 (2006), available at http://www.icirr.org/naeo/docs/pcreport.pdf (recom-
mending that New Americans Initiative reach out to 404,000 immigrants in state eligible for
citizenship to assist them in naturalizing).
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of non-citizens grows, Latino advocates should become increasingly con-
cerned about the absence of formal means to hold public officials accounta-
ble to the interests of that population—a population that contributes to the
economy through its work; to the public fisc through its tax payments; and
to the development of society through its presence.
Elsewhere I have built a case for non-citizen voting as part of the La-
tino civil rights agenda, focusing not only on the fairness and integration
concerns that animate existing normative justifications of the reform, but
also on the problem-solving benefits we would accrue from incorporating
the parties most directly affected by immigration policy into the formal de-
bate.  But calls for non-citizen voting have remained largely the province of
immigrants’ rights advocates with marginal voices.  Perhaps it is time for
powerful Latino interest groups to frame the issue as part of a new civil
rights agenda that broadens the power of Latinos to encompass the full ex-
tent of who they are in American society today.  Advocates’ initial focus
could perhaps be on local elections, recognizing the quotidian concerns ad-
dressed by municipal government as most directly relevant to individuals
regardless of their citizenship status.  Indeed, calls for national-level partici-
pation by non-citizens are as likely to push the public to reinforce the lines
between citizens and non-citizens as they are to persuade Americans to hand
over some formal power to non-citizens.  The idea of voting as constitutive
of citizenship itself will be a hard idea to dislodge, and it is by no means
clear that we want to separate the concepts of citizen and voter.  But local
level participation, in addition to more closely aligning Latino power with
Latino numbers, would also provide a kind of training ground for par-
ticipatory activity for future citizens—a form of preparation that could help
increase Latino turnout in national elections in the future.
In fact, the final three strategies that Latino advocates should pursue as
part of a civic participation agenda are efforts to put Latin American immi-
grants on the path to becoming effective Latino citizens.  The most obvious
means of ensuring immigrant integration include the sorts of language edu-
cation and civics classes touted by people across the political spectrum.  But
despite the glut of rhetoric in the political debate emphasizing the impor-
tance of English-language acquisition and mastery, adult language and liter-
acy classes are woefully under-funded and insufficient in number to meet
current demand.36  Though many states and localities with large immigrant
populations have come to recognize the importance of systematic integration
programs that include well-funded language instruction,37 promoting funding
for the obvious must remain part of the activist agenda.
36 See MARGIE MCHUGH, ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, ADULT ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE INSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETERMINING NEED AND INVESTING WISELY
(2007), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NCIIP_English_Instruction073107.
pdf.
37 I discuss some of these efforts at length in Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, The Significance of
the Local in Immigration Regulation, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), at Part II.A.
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But integration requires more than language and civics training. Be-
cause the acquisition of linguistic and cultural capital takes time, integration
also depends on making institutions familiar to immigrants—a familiarity
that depends on public institutions providing translation and interpretation
services to immigrants as they negotiate the process of assimilation.38  Un-
like English-language classes, however, which are politically saleable, lan-
guage access services are frequently placed on the policy chopping block,
regarded as expensive coddling instead of as indispensable mechanisms of
governance.  Advocates for Latino civic participation must continue their
public and vocal defense of such services, framing them as key mechanisms
of integration for first generation immigrants.  Without access to public insti-
tutions facilitated through language services, immigrants lack the capacity to
defend their interests, or to pressure public institutions and bureaucracies to
respond to their needs and thus to be more effective as policy entities.
Less obvious, but no less important than the promotion of affirmative
integration programs, is pushing for immigration reform that is consistent
with the long-term integration and political empowerment of Latinos.  This
agenda must include continued pursuit of the legalization of the millions of
undocumented workers, whose lives are intertwined with those of legal im-
migrants and U.S. citizens.  This population, which is likely to remain in the
United States in large measure for the foreseeable future despite the recent
ramping up of enforcement efforts, is politically marginal, except as a scape-
goat or as a target of cheap populism.  But its interests in formal integration
in the United States are strong and shared by many legal and citizen Latinos.
Even more important, as the existence of twelve million undocumented
immigrants underscores, it is vital that the United States create more legal
channels for immigration from Latin America39 because legal status repre-
sents the first step toward political visibility.  These channels should include
the option of permanent residence for those workers whose incentives to
come to the United States in search of better wages mature into the desire to
build a life here.  Not only is it counter to the interests of Latinos who seek
to have their numbers counted to allow our labor needs at the low end of the
market to be met through the use of the highly vulnerable immigrants with-
out legal status, the sorts of temporary worker proposals currently favored in
several quarters would exacerbate the crisis of Latino under-empowerment.
Such programs would guarantee the presence of large numbers of Latinos
38 See Rodrı´guez, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 26, at 42-43. R
39 The problem of having a sizable Latino population in the United States without legal
status and therefore with minimal potential to influence the political process also could be
addressed by rigorous enforcement measures.  Though a full discussion of this issue is beyond
the scope of this Essay, the creation of legal channels to absorb the predictable future flow of
immigrants is more likely to work as a policy matter than ramping up enforcement even fur-
ther.  In the last decade, the size of the border patrol has tripled and its funding has quintupled,
but unauthorized immigration remains at record levels. See Tamar Jacoby, Immigration Nation,
85 FOR. AFF. 50 (2006).
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for extended periods of time with no prospects of directly influencing or
participating in politics.40
Measures targeted at building the cultural and linguistic capital of im-
migrants, as well as immigration reform designed to create secure legal sta-
tuses for immigrants, are worthwhile long-term investments.  Such
integration strategies function simultaneously as forms of training and secur-
ity for future U.S. Latinos.  They contribute to the creation of more effective
citizens and force current political majorities to pay attention to the interests
of Latino immigrants, even before they cross the citizenship threshold.  Pur-
suing the integration of immigrants is therefore crucial to the future of Lati-
nos as a group in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Though I have defended the inevitability of the association between
immigrants and Latinos, it is clear that the association must be managed.
Efforts to promote Latino civic participation must simultaneously balance
the need to secure universal participation of all Latinos with the need to
protect the gains that have been made by U.S. Latinos already.  It is impor-
tant to prevent Latinos’ participatory interests from being framed as efforts
to rewrite the social bargain—a charge that could result if the incorporation
of immigrants’ interests, or interests external to the U.S. political commu-
nity, were pushed too hard.  Advocates for Latinos thus face a bewildering
political landscape.  The sheer diversity of interests and identities that fall
under the Latino umbrella make solidarity and coalition-building a chal-
lenge.  Reaching across the citizenship divide to find commonality should
strengthen the position of each of the community’s constituent parts, much as
reaching across the class, race, and national origin differences that character-
ize the Latino grouping contributes to the formation of a political alliance of
significance. In the end, it is our very diversity that makes the Latino vote
the elusive and much-sought after political prize.  By keeping ourselves di-
verse but united, we keep ourselves in play.
40 I have written about the integration-related and democratic dangers presented by tempo-
rary worker programs at length. See Rodrı´guez, Guest Workers and Integration, supra note 11. R
